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OF TIME AND FEEDLOTS: THE
EFFECT OF SPUR INDUSTRIES ON
NUISANCE LAW
OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR. *
In 1972, the Arizona Supreme Court handed down a notable deci-
sion in Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co.,' where it
was necessary to balance the rights of a long established cattle-feeding
operation and a subsequently developed, nearby retirement commu-
nity. The developer of the community sought to enjoin the feedlot,
alleging that it had become a public and private nuisance to residents
of the retirement project because of the odors created and the flies that
the site attracted.2 The court "utilized a unique combination of nui-
sance and indemnification theories" 3 in ruling that the developer was
entitled to enjoin the feedlot as a nuisance but would be required, as a
condition in obtaining the injunctive relief, to indemnify the feeding
operation for the cost of moving or shutting down.4 This Article will
attempt to answer the following questions: From the perspective of
two decades, how does this case fit into the general patterns of nuisance
law? Is it merely the exercise of long recognized powers in equity
* Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma: B.A. 1961, J.D. 1964, University of
Arizona, Tucson; L.L.M., 1965, Stanford University. The author expresses deep
appreciation to his research assistant, Mike McBride III.
1. 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972).
2. Id. at 705.
3. Paul N. Cox, Comment, Plaintiff Required to Indemnify Defendant for Losses
Resulting from Permanent Injunction in a Nuisance Case: Spur Industries Inc. v. Del E.
Webb Development Co., 1973 UTAH L. REv. 55, 61.
4. 494 P.2d at 708.
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courts, or is it an unprecedented grant of a private power of eminent
domain? How has the case been received by other courts and by com-
mentators, and what is its importance in the development of the law
regarding conflicts between neighboring landowners?
NUISANCES-PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
Historically, public policy has favored untrammeled use of land with
the law imposing restrictions on such use only sparingly and with cau-
tion.5 However, the law has also long recognized that relief should be
granted, under the doctrine of nuisance, where a condition or activity
on a landowner's property causes an unreasonable and substantial in-
terference with another person's use and enjoyment of his property.6 If
such interference occurs, the plaintiff suing in nuisance is entitled to
injunctive relief, damages, or both depending on the seriousness of the
nuisance. The reasonableness of the nuisance is determined by weigh-
ing such factors as the extent and character of the harm, the suitability
of the particular locality, the burden on the plaintiff to avoid the harm,
and the value which the law attaches to the type of use or enjoyment
invaded.7
Modem nuisance law has ancient origins. While trespass has been
called the oldest tort action,8 judicial relief for bothersome but non-
trespassory invasions of landowners' use and enjoyment of their prem-
ises is nearly as old.9 The assize of nuisance, a criminal writ, was used
in the thirteenth century to force a person to cease activity which,
although occurring entirely on his own property, caused direct harm to
other property owners.10 Gradually, a civil action for nuisance also
developed. The civil action was easier to institute than the criminal
5. See, eg., Aldridge v. Saxey, 409 P.2d 184, 186 (Or. 1965) (noting that the rule is
that restrictions on land "are construed most strongly against the covenant and will not
be enlarged by construction").
6. See Armory Park Neighborhood Ass'n v. Episcopal Community Servs., 712 P.2d
914, 920-21 (Ariz. 1985) (discussing the requirements of a common law nuisance claim).
7. See Mark L. Collins, Comment, Indemnification of a Nuisance Defendant for
Costs Incurred by Complying with an Injunction, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 1004, 1006-07 (1973)
(discussing private, public and mixed nuisance actions generally).
8. See Marcus C. McCarty & Stephen F. Mathews, Foreclosing Common Law Nui-
sance for Livestock Feedlots: The Iowa Statute, 1981 AGRIc. L.J. 186, 189 (citing P.H.
Winfield, Nuisance as a Tort, 4 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 189, 190 (1931)).
9. McCarty & Mathews, supra note 8, at 193.
10. Id. See generally JoHN G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTs 379 (6th ed. 1983)
(tracing the development of the tort of nuisance).
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writ and allowed recovery of damages in the action at law, but required
resort to a court of equity to obtain injunctive relief." The assize of
nuisance and the subsequently developed civil action led to the modem
action of private nuisance, which permits recovery for a person's un-
reasonable and substantial interference with another's use and enjoy-
ment of his real property. 2 During the same time, a related action for
public nuisance developed from separate historical roots. 3 The public
nuisance action is primarily a criminal action to protect society's rights
from unreasonable disturbances. 4 An individual may also use public
nuisance as the basis of a civil action for damages or an injunction if
the individual can show special damages.15 To recover special dam-
ages, a plaintiff must show his damages were different from those suf-
fered by the general public.16 Moreover, the special damages do not
have to be real property damages but can be merely substantial harm to
enjoyment of life.17
Public nuisances thus infringe on rights shared by the whole commu-
nity,"8 whereas private nuisances interfere with individual rights. 9
11. McCarty & Mathews, supra note 8, at 193. See generally William A. McRae,
Jr., The Development of Nuisance in the Early Common Law, 1 U. FLA. L. REv. 27
(1948) (tracing the historical development of the law of nuisance); F.H. Newark, The
Boundaries of Nuisance, 65 LAw Q. REv. 480 (1949) (defining the requirements to state
a cause of action for nuisance and available remedies); William H. Wilson, Comment,
Nuisance as a Modern Mode of Land Use Control, 46 WASH. L. REv. 47, 54-56 (1970)
(describing the development of a cause of action for private nuisance).
12. See McCarty & Mathews, supra note 8, at 193-94 (discussing the evolution of
the private nuisance action).
13. Id. at 195. See also William L. Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52
VA. L. REv. 997, 998-99 (1966) [hereinafter Prosser, Private Action] (noting the sepa-
rate development of public and private nuisance doctrines). See generally William L.
Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TEX. L. REv., 399, 410-16 (1942) [hereinafter
Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault] (calling nuisance a "legal garbage can" and identify-
ing the distinct doctrines of public and private nuisance); John W. Wade, Environmen-
tal Protection, the Common Law of Nuisance, and the Restatement of Torts, 8 FORUM
165, 165-72 (1972) (discussing the applicability of the private and public nuisance doc-
trines to recover for pollution injuries).
14. McCarty & Mathews, supra note 8, at 195.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. See generally Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., Public Nuisance: A Crime in Tort
Law, 31 OKu.A. L. REv. 318, 332-37 (1978) (discussing the "special injury"
requirement).
18. See Echave v. City of Grand Junction, 193 P.2d 277, 280 (Colo. 1948) (recog-
nizing a nuisance as doing or failing to do something injuriously affecting the public's
safety, health or morals, or substantially annoying, inconveniencing or injuring the pub-
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The same activity or conduct may constitute both a public and a pri-
vate nuisance.2 ° For instance, the Spur Industries case has been called
"an excellent example of a mixed nuisance action."21 In Spur, the
feedlot interfered with both the general community's enjoyment of life
and the use and enjoyment of their land.22 In addition, the plaintiff in
Spur, a developer, could show both harm to the general public and
unique harm to himself.23
While recovery for a private nuisance is generally limited to damages
or injunctive relief, criminal liability is usually considered an essential
requirement of a public nuisance.24 There is a trend toward holding
that a criminal violation is not essential to public nuisance liability in
tort. Instead, the fact that the activity amounts to a crime is merely
one factor to weigh in determining the unreasonableness of defendant's
conduct.25
lic); Mandell v. Pivnick, 125 A.2d 175, 176 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1956) (recognizing that a
nuisance which violates public rights and produces a common injury constitutes a pub-
lic nuisance).
19. W.G. Duncan Coal Co. v. Jones, 254 S.W.2d 720, 723 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953)
(explaining that public nuisances affect the public at large while private nuisances affect
an individual or a limited group of individuals); see Adams v. Commissioners of
Trappe, 102 A.2d 830, 834 (Md. 1954) (defining public and private nuisances, and dis-
tinguishing nuisances per se and nuisances in fact).
20. Garfield Box Co. v. Clifton Paper Bd. Co., 17 A.2d 588, 589 (N.J. 1941); see
McGee v. Yazoo & M.V.R. Co., 19 So. 2d 21, 22 (La. 1944) (holding that a facility
polluting the atmosphere may be a public nuisance enjoinable by municipality and also
a private nuisance actionable by a neighboring property owner).
21. Collins, supra note 7, at 1007.
22. Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 706 (Ariz. 1972).
23. Id. The Spur court reasoned that the plaintiff, "having shown a special injury in
the loss of sales, had a [sic] standing to bring suit to enjoin the nuisance." Id. (citing
Engle v. Clark, 90 P.2d 994 (Ariz. 1939); City of Phoenix v. Johnson, 75 P.2d 30 (Ariz.
1938)).
24. Wilson, supra note 11, at 98 (discussing the development of the public nuisance
doctrine). See generally Marvin A. Catzman, Comment, Municipal Law-Nuisance-
Proposed Festival to Be Held in Local Municipality---By-Law to Regulate and License
Holding of Public Entertainments and Festivals--Common Law Remedy an Effective
Alternative to Municipal Legislation, 43 CAN. B. Rnv. 100, 104-06 (1965) (arguing that
a sufficiently large number of private nuisances may constitute a public nuisance); Com-
ment, Nuisance: Public and Private Nuisance Distinguished, 74 S. AR. L.J. 339, 339(1957) (recognizing that a public nuisance "materially affects the reasonable comfort
and convenience of life of a class of Her Majesty's subjects" (quoting Attorney-General
v. P.Y.A. Zuarries, Ltd., 2 W.L.R. 770 (C.A. 1957))).
25. See Reynolds, supra note 17, at 328 (suggesting that this analysis, if adopted,
would recognize that a defendant's actions might constitute a public nuisance in the
absence of criminal responsibility).
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Apart from the criminal violation and the "special damage" require-
ments, three other prerequisites to tort liability for public nuisance are
often mentioned. There must be: (1) an interference with rights of the
public or a considerable number of persons; (2) an interference with
the plaintiff's enjoyment of life that is unreasonable and substantial;
and (3) a recognized basis for tort liability - intent, negligence, or
strict liability.
26
Tort liability for private, rather than public, nuisance is often much
easier to establish since only an unreasonable and substantial interfer-
ence with the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of real property need be
shown. A plaintiff is not required to establish special harm, violation
of a criminal law, or interference with the public.2' Apart from the
alleged interference with the real property, the plaintiff only needs to
show some basis for tort liability. This could amount to intent, negli-
gence, or strict liability.2" Despite the simplicity of the private nui-
sance tort action, public nuisance may be a more advantageous theory
for the individual plaintiff because it does not require a showing of in-
terference with real property, but merely interference with enjoyment
of life.29 Moreover, because public nuisances typically involve criminal
violations, the statute of limitations does not start to run as long as the
public nuisance continues.30 Ordinarily, however, private nuisance
will be the easiest to utilize because a plaintiff alleging public nuisance
must show interference with the health, safety or welfare of at least a
26. Id. at 320.
27. Id. at 319-20.
28. Id See also Wright v. Masonite Corp., 237 F. Supp. 129, 139 (M.D.N.C. 1965)
(refusing to hold the defendant liable for private nuisance where his actions were not
negligent, reckless, or ultrahazardous), aff'd, 368 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1966), cert denied,
386 U.S. 934 (1967); Ettl v. Land & Loan Co., 5 A.2d 689, 691 (N.J. 1939) (recognizing
a cause of action for private nuisance where the landowner acts wrongfully, negligently,
or unskillfully, and injures the adjoining premises unnecessarily). See generally G.H.L.
Fridman, Motive in the English Law of Nuisance, 40 VA. L. Rv. 583, 586-88 (1954)
(examining the role of the defendant's motive in defining the elements of nuisance).
29. See Taylor v. City of Cincinnati, 55 N.E.2d 724, 727 (Ohio 1944) (recognizing
that nuisance may involve a "wrongful invasion of the use and enjoyment of property,
... [or] the wrongful invasion of personal legal rights and privileges generally"). See
generally Wilfred Estey, Public Nuisance and Standing to Sue, 10 OSGOODE HALL L.J.
563 (1972) (concluding that the Canadian legal system is unreceptive to private actions
for public nuisance); Mark A. Rothstein, Private Actions for Public Nuisance: The
Standing Problem, 76 W. VA. L. REV. 453,454-55 (1974) (describing public nuisance as
a "catch-all" for "everything that endangers life or health, gives offense to sense, vio-
lates the laws of decency, or obstructs reasonable and comfortable use of property").
30. Reynolds, supra note 17, at 342.
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considerable number of people.31
Traditionally, the interference in public nuisance had to involve the
disturbance of a right enjoyed by the general public, such as use of a
public highway.32 Public nuisance requirements have been relaxed,
however, and a number of states require that the disturbance merely
affect a considerable number of people rather than the public in gen-
eral.33 Whether the requirement is strict or relaxed, it remains an im-
portant distinguishing feature between public and private nuisances.3 4
TRADITIONAL REMEDIES FOR NUISANCE
Remedies for nuisance have gradually changed over the centuries.
Under the old writ of assize,35 the remedy was judicial abatement.36
With the development of civil actions, damages were allowed. For a
time, these remedies were considered adequate to prevent continuation
of the nuisance because of the unlikelihood that the defendant would
take the risk of incurring further liability.37 The power of courts of
equity to enjoin nuisances was first recognized in a 1720 English case.38
31. See Padilla v. Lawrence, 685 P.2d 964, 970 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984) (explaining
that a public nuisance must affect the rights of a "considerable amount of people or an
entire community or neighborhood"). See also supra note 26 and accompanying text
explaining the necessary elements of a public nuisance cause of action.
32. See Reynolds, supra note 17, at 321. See also Higgins v. Connecticut Light &
Power Co., 30 A.2d 388 (Conn. 1943) (refusing a private party's public nuisance claim
where the plaintiff failed to prove a danger to the general public); Smith v. City of
Sedalia, 53 S.W. 907, 911 (Mo. 1899) (holding that polluting several landowners' prop-
erty does not constitute a public nuisance because the pollution does not injure the
public generally); People v. Brooklyn & Queens Transit Corp., 15 N.Y.S.2d 295 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1939) (holding that noises from a trolley car over a right of way did not
constitute a public nuisance because plaintiffs suffered in the private enjoyment of their
homes), aff'd, 28 N.E.2d 925 (1940); Denis P. Burke, Common Scents: An Analysis of
the Law of Feed Lot Odor Control, 10 CREIGHTON L. REv. 539, 561 (1977) (citing as an
example of a public nuisance State v. Kaster, 35 Iowa 221 (1872), where a feedlot was
located near a public street in a populous neighborhood).
33. See Reynolds, supra note 17, at 321.
34. See Note, "'11 Blows the Wind that Profits Nobody" Control of Odors from Iowa
Livestock Confinement Facilities, 57 IowA L. REv. 451, 457-58 (1971) (explaining the
conditional aspects of both public and private nuisance actions).
35. See supra note 10 and accompanying text describing the assize of nuisance.
36. C. HAAR & M. WOLF, LAND-USE PLANNING 124 (4th ed. 1989).
37. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 222.
38. Bush v. Western, 24 Eng. Rep. 237 (1720). In Bush, the plaintiffs sought an
injunction to quiet possession. The defendants objected, arguing that if the plaintiff had
any remedy, it was at law. The court overruled this objection, recognizing that an eq-
uity court could hear plaintiff's claim. Id. at 237-38.
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Through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the power to enjoin
was generally considered a matter of grace on the part of the court. 39
By the dawn of the twentieth century, it was increasingly recognized
that the exercise of a chancellor's grace was sometimes a matter of
right.4°
Traditionally, an appropriate case for injunctive relief has been one
in which money damages are inadequate, such as where the harm is
continuing in nature41 or where the frequent or constant recurrence of
the bothersome activity would require a multiplicity of suits in order to
award adequate compensation.42 Thus, an injunction may be issued,
for instance, to halt continuing dissemination of bothersome odors.43
A court should frame an injunction to prevent only the troublesome
effects. Moreover, courts should always balance the interests of the
parties and allow a defendant's basic activity to continue as long as it is
conducted without causing unreasonable and substantial annoyance to
others." If the activity cannot continue without causing substantial
39. Richard's Appeal, 57 Pa. 105, 112 (1868) (reasoning that in determining
whether to enjoin the nuisance, the chancellor should ask whether a greater injury
would result from enjoining or refusing to enjoin the nuisance). But see Walters v.
McElroy, 25 A. 125, 127 (Pa. 1892) (arguing that in the context of cases seeking equita-
ble relief, the phrase "of grace ... has no rightful place in the jurisprudence of a free
commonwealth"). See generally Hennessey v. Carmony, 25 A. 374, 379 (N.J. Ch. 1892)
(discussing the court's "discretion" in granting equitable relief).
40. Sullivan v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 57 A. 1065, 1071 (Pa. 1904). In Sulli-
van, the court explained that "grace sometimes becomes a matter of right to the suitor
in his court... [and] when it is clear that the law cannot give protection and relief...
the chancellor can no more withhold his grace than the law can deny protection and
relief if able to give them." Id.
41. Padilla v. Lawrence, 685 P.2d 964, 970 (1984) (recognizing that although
money damages may be inadequate where the nuisance is continuing, the trial court is
not required to grant an injunction in all continuing nuisance cases).
42. See Scott v. Jordan, 661 P.2d 59, 64 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983). See also Winrock
Enters., Inc. v. House of Fabrics, 579 P.2d 787, 790 (1978) (noting that injunctive relief
is appropriate when denying the injunction would require a multiplicity of suits).
43. See Lyon v. Cascade Commodities Corp., 496 P.2d 951 (Idaho 1972) (reinstat-
ing an order temporarily enjoining the operation of a plant allegedly disseminating
odors and stenches).
44. See id. (allowing defendants to resume operations if they can demonstrate that
the new equipment they installed eliminated the nuisance); see also Haack v. Lindsay
Light & Chem. Co., 66 N.E.2d 391, 394 (Ill. 1946) (allowing the court to consider the
essential nature of defendant's actions in determining whether they are reasonable);
Powell v. Bentley & Gerwig Furniture Co., 12 S.E. 1085, 1087 (W. Va. 1891) (reasoning
that courts should grant injunctions cautiously and only if plaintiff clearly establishes
the nuisance); Wood v. Sutcliffe, 61 Eng. Rep. 303, 305 (1851) (denying an injunction
because it would seriously injure or ruin the defendant's business).
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annoyance, then it should be enjoined altogether, even if the activity is
permitted under applicable zoning and land-use laws.45
In 1858, Lord Cairns' Act provided that English courts may grant
damages either in addition to or in substitution for injunctive relief.46
Courts in the United States have followed this procedure in nuisance
cases and have balanced the interests of the parties and the community
in determining whether to allow damages for nuisance.47 Courts make
the same considerations when deciding whether to grant an injunction.
Private nuisance, in particular, requires the balancing of the rights of
all parties in order to determine whether or not the tort itself exists.4 8
Assuming a nuisance is found to exist, three principal methods of
granting relief have developed: (1) the court may issue an injunction
requiring the defendant, at his own expense, to terminate the bother-
some effects of his activity together, if appropriate, with an award of
damages for past harm; (2) the court may deny an injunction but
award damages for future and past harm suffered by the plaintiff;49 or
(3) the court may issue an injunction requiring the defendant to termi-
nate the bothersome effects of his activity, but may condition the in-
junction on the plaintiff paying the cost of the termination.
Given the choice between damages and injunctive relief, most com-
45. See Armory Park Neighborhood Ass'n v. Episcopal Community Servs., 712
P.2d 914, 921 (Ariz. 1985) (holding that the defendant's compliance with zoning regula-
tions did not preclude an injunction). See generally Timothy C. Lothe, Comment,
"Feed the Hungry, But Not on Our Block"-Armory Park Neighborhood Association v.
Episcopal Community Services in Arizona, 28 ARIZ. L. REV. 121, 126 (1986). The
author criticizes Armory Park to the extent that it limits social programs. Id. at 132.
46. An Act to amend the Course of Procedure in the High Court of Chancery, the
Court of Chancery in Ireland, and the Court of Chancery of the County Palatine of
Lancaster, 1958, 21 & 22 Vict., ch. 37 (Eng.). See J.A. Jolowicz, Damages in Equity-A
Study of Lord Cairns'Act, 34 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 224 (1975) (recognizing the availability
of this option to courts where a remedy law would be inadequate and an injunction
would be inappropriate).
47. See Carpenter v. Double R Cattle Co., 701 P.2d 222, 227 (Idaho 1985) (recog-
nizing that in a nuisance action for damages, the court should consider the community's
interests).
48. See Waschak v. Moffat, 109 A.2d 310, 314 (Pa. 1954) (determining whether an
intentional act is a nuisance requiring a balancing of the conduct's harm and its utility).
See generally Glen E. Clover, Note, Torts: Trespass, Nuisance and E=mc2, 19 OKLA.
L. REv. 117 (1966) (explaining the weighing process used in determining nuisance
liability).
49. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 874-75 (N.Y. 1970)
(granting the plaintiff damages for past and future harm).
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mentatorss° and courts5 l have preferred damages, although one lead-
mng commentator has attacked this reasoning and concluded that
neither remedy is more economically efficient than, or otherwise supe-
rior to, the other.52 As to the three aforementioned combinations of
possible relief, the third method, sometimes called a "compensated in-
junction," has generally been ignored by legal commentators.53 This
practice has been praised, however, as discouraging plaintiffs from
seeking inefficient injunctive restraints because the costs of the injunc-
tion are shifted to the plaintiff.54
One method occasionally employed by courts in choosing between
damages and injunctive relief involves determining whether the utility
of the defendant's conduct outweighs the harm to the plaintiff." There
are situations in which an injunction is the only appropriate relief.
This often occurs with a "prospective nuisance," which is a nuisance
that is merely threatened but not yet carried into effect. It is well es-
tablished that a court may enjoin this type of nuisance even though no
50. See M. Theresa Hupp, Note, Efficient Land Use and the Internalization of Bene-
ficial Spillovers: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 31 STAN. L. REv. 457, 465 (1979)
(noting the recent trend among courts to award damage remedies); Barton H. Thomp-
son, Jr., Note, Injunction Negotiations: An Economic, Moral, and Legal Analysis, 27
STAN. L. REV. 1563, 1566 n.13 (1975) (noting the preference for damages over injunc-
tive relief).
English courts have traditionally preferred injunctive relief to damages, though there
may be some change in judicial attitude in recent years. See A.I. Ogus & G.M. Rich-
ardson, Economics and the Environment: A Study of Private Nuisance, 36 CAMBRIDGE
L.J. 284, 308-10 (1977) (discussing cases where courts fail to consider economic conse-
quences as well as social effects when deciding whether to award damages or to issue
injunctions). On the rationales for injunction, see generally Note, Developments in the
Law: Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1002-04 (1965) (discussing the problems in-
herent in the damage remedy resulting in injunctive relief awards).
51. See, eg., Spur Industries v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 705 (Ariz.
1972). The Spur court stated that "[w]here the injury is slight, the remedy for minor
inconveniences lies in an action for damages rather than in one for an injunction." Id.
52. A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of
Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075, 1111-12 (1980) (stating that
a determination of whether injunctive relief or damages will serve as a better remedy
depends upon the circumstances).
53. Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and
Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 738 (1973) (arguing that conflicts
among landowners are better resolved by systems other than traditional zoning
controls).
54. Id. at 739.
55. See Wade, supra note 13, at 170 (stating factors to consider when analyzing the
gravity of the harm and the utility of defendant's conduct).
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damage has occurred.5
6
Several miscellaneous remedies occasionally surface in nuisance ju-
risprudence. One possible remedy is abatement through either judicial
action or a plaintiff's exercise of self-help.57 In the case of public nui-
sance, there is also the possibility of criminal prosecution. 8 However,
damages and injunctive relief are generally regarded as the two impor-
tant "private" remedies currently available to resolve nuisance
disputes.59
TRADITIONAL DEFENSES TO NUISANCE
Contributory negligence has been the source of a great deal of confu-
sion in public nuisance cases.' However, the basic rule is clear: If the
public nuisance action is founded on the defendant's intentional inter-
ference with the plaintiff, contributory negligence is not a defense.61
But if the defendant, in creating or maintaining the nuisance, merely
acted negligently toward the plaintiff, contributory negligence is a pos-
sible defense. 62 The principal confusion arises in cases in which the
defendant has intentionally invaded the public right, but has only acted
negligently toward the plaintiff. For example, if the defendant deliber-
56. See Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Servs., Inc., 426 N.E.2d 824(Il. 1981) (hold-
ing that a chemical waste disposal site was a nuisance both presently and prospectively).
See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS, § 89 at 640-41 (5th ed. 1984).
57. See Wilson, supra note 11, at 75-76 (discussing abatement options for private
nuisance).
58. Id. at 10 7-09 (discussing criminal prosecution options for public nuisance).
59. See Polinsky, supra note 52, at 1075-76 (explaining how courts may use the
various remedies to resolve disputes in an economically efficient and equitable manner).
60. Prosser, Private Action, supra note 13, at 1023. See generally Warren A. Sea-
vey, Nuisance. Contributory Negligence and Other Mysteries, 65 HARV. L. REv. 984
(1952) (explaining the nuisance cause of action and the contributory negligence
defense).
61. Niagara Oil Co. v. Ogle, 98 N.E. 60, 62 (Ind. 1912) (explaining that because a
nuisance action is not negligence, contributory negligence has no application); Hanson
v. Hall, 279 N.W. 227, 229-30 (Minn. 1938) (noting that where action is based on an
intentional invasion, contributory negligence is no defense); Town of Gilmer v. Pickett,
228 S.W. 347, 348 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) (same); Higginbotham v. Kearse, 161 S.E. 37,
40 (W. Va. 1931) (same).
62. Terrell v. Alabama Water Serv. Co., 15 So. 2d 727, 731 (Ala. 1943) (explaining
that if a defendant acts negligently, contributory negligence may be used as a defense);
Denny v. Garavaglia, 52 N.W.2d 521, 528 (Mich. 1952) (same); McFarlane v. City of
Niagara Falls, 160 N.E. 391, 393 (N.Y. 1928) (same); Llewellyn v. City of Knoxville,
232 S.W.2d 568, 576 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1950) (same).
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ately created an obstruction to a public road, the defendant would have
intentionally violated a public right even though there may have been
no substantial certainty that the obstruction would interfere with the
plaintiff. A majority of jurisdictions appear to have found contributory
negligence available as a defense in this situation.6 3 Although contrib-
utory negligence may not always be available, assumption of risk is
generally agreed to be a possible defense to public nuisance."
The basic rules which govern private nuisance defenses are similar.
Contributory negligence is not a defense where nuisance liability is
based on the defendant's intent, but is available where liability is
founded on negligence. s5 Assumption of risk, however, has generally
been available regardless of the basis of the action. 6
Considerable controversy has surrounded the doctrine of "coming to
63. See Calder v. City & County of San Francisco, 123 P.2d 897, 898 (Cal. Ct. App.
1942) (explaining that a contributory negligence defense is available when a nuisance
and negligence tort coexists); Runnells v. Maine Cent. R.R., 190 A.2d 739, 743-44 (Me.
1963) (same); McKenna v. Andreassi, 197 N.E. 879, 883 (Mass. 1935) (same); Schiro v.
Oriental Realty Co., 76 N.W.2d 355, 360 (Wis. 1956) (holding that contributory negli-
gence is available for damages actions for nuisance). But see De Lahunta v. City of
Waterbury, 59 A.2d 800, 802 (Conn. 1948) (holding that contributory negligence is
unavailable when a defendant intentionally creates a nuisance); Delaney v. Philhern
Realty Holding Corp., 21 N.E.2d 507, 509 (N.Y. 1939) (explaining that contributory
negligence is unavailable in absolute nuisance cases); cf. Flaherty v. Great N. Ry., 16
N.W.2d 553, 555 (Minn. 1944) (where an injury is sustained as result of intentional
obstruction of highway in violation of statute, contributory negligence is no defense);
Baker v. City of Wheeling, 185 S.E. 842 (W. Va. 1936).
64. See Beckwith v. Town of Stratford, 29 A.2d 775, 778 (Conn. 1942) (assumption
of the risk may be a defense even when absolute nuisance is involved); Hammond v.
Monmouth County, 186 A. 452, 455 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1936) (assumption of the risk is a
bar to recovery in a public nuisance action).
65. See Comment, Nuisance or Negligence: A Study in the Tyranny of Labels, 24
IND. L.J. 402, 406 (1949) (reviewing nuisance authorities). See generally Raoul Berger,
Comment, Contributory Negligence as a Defense to Nuisance, 29 ILL. L. REV. 372
(1934) (discussing the history of contributory negligence generally and as applied in
nuisance cases); W. E. Shipley, Annotation, Contributory Negligence or Assumption of
Risk as Defense to Action for Damages for Nuisance-Modern Views, 73 A.L.R. 2D 1378
(1960).
66. See H. Morris Denton, Comment, Nuisance: Contributory Negligence or As-
sumption of Risk as Defense, 28 TENN. L. REV. 561, 568-69 (1961) (explaining contrib-
utory negligence availability to nuisance suits); Shipley, supra note 65, at 1399. Even in
cases based on intentional conduct, such as flooding, courts have sometimes denied
plaintiff's relief for harm that could have been averted through exercising due care and
little effort or expense. See Lisko v. Uhren, 204 S.W. 101, 102 (Ark. 1918) (noting that
the plaintiff had a duty to prevent his hay from flooding water due to the defendant);
Jenkins v. Stephens, 262 P. 274 (Utah 1927) (plaintiff has a duty to avoid consequences
of defendant's flooding his property). See generally Seavey, supra note 60, at 989.
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the nuisance" which, like assumption of risk, is rooted in the ancient
maxim volenti non fit injuria. 67 This doctrine provides that an individ-
ual, although aware of the danger, voluntarily subjecting himself to a
risk, is precluded from recovery.68 This issue is frequently raised when
the plaintiff has acquired property in the vicinity of the defendant's
premises, knowing of the defendant's possibly bothersome activity. 69
It is widely agreed that the contributory negligence defense is unavaila-
ble in public nuisance cases because they traditionally involve criminal
conduct. Mere priority in time confers no right to commit a crime.70
In private nuisance, modem authority generally does not treat "coming
to the nuisance" as an automatic bar to plaintiff's relief but instead, as
a "circumstance of considerable weight."71
Through the years, the "coming to the nuisance" doctrine has be-
come less important.72 Commentators have criticized the doctrine be-
cause it allows an accidental priority in time to determine the future
development of an area.73 Some recent authority appears to ignore pri-
ority in time altogether74 whereas other authority applies priority in
time sweepingly. For example, a court applied a city's priority broadly
in determining that the priority accrued upon the city's founding. The
court concluded that the city's priority applied not only to the area the
city then occupied, but also to areas in which the city subsequently
67. See Donald Wittman, First Come, First Served: An Economic Analysis of "Com-
ing to the Nuisance," 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 557, 557 (1980) (analyzing the legal implication
of first establishing property rights).
68. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1575 (6th ed. 1990).
69. See Allison v. Smith, 695 P.2d 791 (Colo. App. 1984) (holding that plaintiff did
not "come to the nuisance" when the plaintiff acquired property prior to the defendant's
bothersome activity).
70. See generally Collins, supra note 7, at 1009 (explaining that the mere priority of
occupation is one factor in determining whether the defendant's activities are
reasonable).
71. See Schlotfelt v. Vinton Farmers' Supply Co., 109 N.W.2d 695, 699 (Iowa 1961)
(giving considerable weight to the fact that the plaintiff occupied an area prior to any
industrial activities), Padilla v. Lawrence, 685 P.2d 964, 968 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984)
(explaining that priority of occupation is given considerable weight in determining
reasonableness).
72. Wittman, supra note 67, at 557-58 (explaining that the doctrine "has gradually
withered in importance").
73. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 4.04, at 97 (2d ed. 1988).
74. See Botsch v. Leigh Land Co., 239 N.W.2d 481, 484-87 (Neb. 1976) (ignoring
the fact that defendants' property was being used as a feedlot when plaintiffs moved into
the area).
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expanded.75
The "coming to the nuisance" doctrine recognizes that an implied
consent to conditions should preclude, under equitable principles, a
consenting party from successfully complaining later about those con-
ditions.76 The Spur court commented that "coming to the nuisance"
could justifiably preclude relief if the encroaching developer had been
the only party injured by the nuisance. If Spur had located its feedlot
near a developing city, however, Spur would have had to suffer abate-
ment of its operation.
77
Some commentators have stated that the majority of courts believes
that a plaintiff is not barred from relief in either a public or a private
nuisance merely by "coming to the nuisance."7 " However, priority in
time is frequently an important factor in private nuisance actions to
determine whether a court should grant relief.79 Some qualifications to
the relevance of this factor have been expressed over the years. It has
been noted, for instance, that the time when either the plaintiff or de-
fendant acquired ownership of their property should be irrelevant.8 0
The relevant factor, if any, is the priority of use between the plaintiff
and defendant, or their predecessors in interest.8 " If the allegedly both-
ersome use of the defendant's property did not constitute a nuisance
initially, then this fact should benefit the defendant regardless of
whether he owned the property when the use commenced.
8 2
75. City of Lyons v. Betts, 171 N.W.2d 792, 794 (Neb. 1969) (applying "coming to
the nuisance" in reverse: since plaintiff (the city) was first in time, it has an absolute
right to prevent subsequent activities that annoy city residents).
76. See Scott v. Jordan, 661 P.2d 59, 63 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983) (explaining a possible
acquiescence defense as applied to nuisance actions). Cf. Kellogg v. Village of Viola,
227 N.W.2d 55, 58 (Wis. 1975) (reasoning that the fact that defendant arrived first
"does not grant [defendant] a perpetual easement to pollute the air").
77. Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 707 (Ariz. 1972).
78. See W. PROSSER ET AL., CASES & MATERIALS ON TORTS 846 (8th ed. 1988)
(noting the existence of this majority rule). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 840D (1979) (explaining and illustrating the "coming to the nuisance" doe-
trine). See generally Note, Present Day Rules Reminiscent of the Theory of "Coming to
a Nuisance," 17 TEMP. L.Q. 449, 449 (1943) (discussing the historical development of
nuisance law).
79. See East St. Johns Shingle Co. v. City of Portland, 246 P.2d 554, 563 (Or. 1952)
(denying plaintiff either an injunction or damages where defendant had already been
polluting water when plaintiff purchased its property).
80. See Edward Rabin, Nuisance Law: Rethinking Fundamental Assumptions, 63
VA. L. REv. 1299, 1322 (1977) (arguing that time of ownership should be irrelevant).
81. Id.
82. See Ellickson, supra note 53, at 759 n.260 (1973) (discussing cases where plain-
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Arguably, the weight accorded "coming to the nuisance" should
vary according to the plaintiff's knowledge. The equities weigh against
the plaintiff if, after having full knowledge of the defendant's activities,
the plaintiff developed his own property in such a manner that its use is
disturbed by the defendant's activities. With these possible qualifica-
tions, it seems that priority in time is usually relevant to the question of
whether an activity is unreasonable and therefore a nuisance.8 3 There
is some authority, however, stating that priority in time, although of
consequence in the balancing process necessary to determine whether
an injunction shall issue, is irrelevant in a damage action. 4
Some commentators support the use of the "coming to the nuisance"
doctrine on the ground that it induces plaintiffs to mitigate their dam-
ages. The doctrine denies recovery for improvements made by plain-
tiffs after the nuisance is in operation. Some authorities believe that
there is simply a strong ethical argument in favor of the first person to
settle in an area.85 Legislators have recognized this ethical argument
and statutorily provided that after certain uses have been in existence
for a designated time, they cannot be found nuisances based upon in-
terference with subsequently changed conditions in the neighbor-
hood.8 6 The trend is clearly toward rejecting "coming to the nuisance"
tiff has improved land after nuisance); Cassius Kirk, Jr., Note, Torts: Nuisance "Com-
ing to the Nuisance" as a Defense, 41 CAL. L. REv. 148 (1953) (discussing East St.
John's Shingle Co., supra note 79).
83. See Green v. McCloud, 197 S.W.2d 258, 260 (Ky. 1946) ("coming to the nui-
sance" is one factor in determining the equities of a given case); Hall v. Budde, 169
S.W.2d 33, 33 (Ky. Ct. App. 1943) (same); Ensign v. Walls, 34 N.W.2d 549 (Mich.
1948) (same); Kosich v. Poultrymen's Serv. Corp., 43 A.2d 15, 19 (N.J. Ch. 1945)
(same); Frank v. Cossitt Cement Prods., 97 N.Y.S.2d 337, 339 (Sup. Ct. 1950) (same);
McCarty v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 81 N.E. 549, 550 (N.Y. 1907) (same); Watts v.
Pama Mfg. Co., 124 S.E.2d 809, 814 (N.C. 1962) (same); Spencer Creek Pollution Con-
trol Ass'n v. Organic Fertilizer Co., 505 P.2d 919, 921 (Or. 1973) (same); Young v.
Brown, 46 S.E.2d 673, 678-79 (S.C. 1948) (same); Abdella v. Smith, 149 N.W.2d 537,
541 (Wis. 1967) (same). For a more comprehensive discussion of "coming to the nui-
sance" as a defense, see generally Thelma M. Chapman, Note, Torts-Nuisance, "Com-
ing to the Nuisance," 32 OR. L. REV. 264 (1953); Ferdinand S. Tinio, Annotation,
"Coming to Nuisance" as a Defense or Estoppel, 42 A.L.R. 3D 344 (1972).
84. See Kellogg v. City of Viola, 227 N.W.2d 55, 58 (Wis. 1975) ("coming to the
nuisance" irrelevant in a damage action for nuisance).
85. See Alan D. Freeman, Give and Take: Distributing Local Environmental Con-
trol Through Land Use Rejection, 60 MINN. L. R.v. 883, 919-20 (1976) (exploring the
question of whether priority in time gives a superior ethical position).
86. See, eg., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-52-4(f) (Bums 1986). The Indiana statute
provides:
(f) No agricultural or industrial operation or any of its appurtenances shall be or
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as an automatic bar to relief,8 7 particularly if a plaintiff is part of a
natural wave of growth and development that has gradually ap-
proached a defendant's formerly harmless use.8
SPUR INDUSTRIES' PLACE IN NUISANCE LAW
Feedlots, such as the one involved in Spur Industries, have often
been the subject of nuisance suits because of the odors emanating from
these operations.8 9 A few states, notably Iowa and Nebraska, have
adopted special statutes to govern feedlot odor cases." However, the
majority of jurisdictions rely on the common law of nuisance to govern
these actions. According to the common law, an injured party may be
entitled to damages for diminution in property value as well as com-
pensation for interference with personal health and comfort. If mone-
tary damages are inadequate, as where the harm is continuing in
nature, courts may award injunctive relief.9" A New Mexico appellate
court allowed injunctive relief when it found that pollution, ffies, and
noxious odors from a cattle feedlot were oppressive, substantial and
continuous in nature.92 A plaintiff in a feedlot nuisance action may
become a nuisance, private or public, by any changed conditions in the vicinity of
the locality after the agricultural or industrial operation, as the case may be, has
been in operation continuously on the locality for more than one year, provided:
(1) There is no significant change in the hours of operation;
(2) There is no significant change in the type of operation; and
(3) The operation would not have been a nuisance at the time the agricultural or
industrial operation, as the case may be, began on that locality.
Id.
87. See Kirk, supra note 82, at 149 (discussing "coming to the nuisance" and its
interpretation). See supra note 78 and accompanying text for a discussion of this trend.
88. See generally ROBERT R. WRIGHT & SUSAN W. WRIGHT, LAND USE IN A
NUTSHELL 23 (2d ed. 1985).
89. See Paula M. Recker, Animal Feeding Factories and the Envirnment" A Sum-
mary of Feedlot Pollution, Federal Controls, and Oklahoma Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 556, 557-
58 (1976) (describing the putrid odors emanating from feedlots). See generally Note,
supra note 35, at 457 (discussing feedlot odors control problems and nuisance causes of
action).
90. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 172D (West 1990); NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-1501
(1987). For a comprehensive discussion of the Iowa statute, see generally McCarty &
Mathews, supra note 8. For a comprehensive discussion of the Nebraska statute and its
history, see generally Burke, supra note 32.
91. See Padilla v. Lawrence, 685 P.2d 964, 970 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984) (recognizing
that monetary damages are inadequate where harm is continuing in nature, making
injunctive relief proper).
92. Scott v. Jordan, 661 P.2d 59, 64 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983).
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also be denied relief on the basis of the "coming to the nuisance" doc-
trine. This will only occur if the defendant's use clearly constituted a
nuisance at the time that the plaintiff arrived.9"
In Spur Industries, 94 the Arizona court recognized traditional nui-
sance and "coming to the nuisance" doctrines, but varied the tradi-
tional analysis in three respects. First, the court addressed the
"coming to the nuisance" doctrine, distinguishing between the individ-
ual plaintiff and the public. The court found the doctrine inapplicable
to the public's nuisance claim, at least where a public nuisance was
involved.95 This doctrinal analysis is not unusual except that it distin-
guishes between the individual's and the public's "coming to the nui-
sance." 96 Second, courts have often enjoined a nuisance only after
balancing the equities to determine whether damages or injunctive re-
lief would produce less harm.97 The Arizona court did not engage in
this balancing and simply enjoined the feedlot on the basis that it con-
stituted a statutory public nuisance.9" Again, this is not a radical de-
parture from existing law, given the elements of a public nuisance99
and the court's finding that a public nuisance existed. Third, the Spur
court added a new step to the determination of the proper remedy in a
nuisance case. The court asked whether a successful plaintiff obtaining
an injunction should, in fairness, reimburse the enjoined defendant for
all or part of the damage resulting from the injunction. 1"
In Spur, the court found the reimbursement a fair and proper re-
quirement in return for the injunctive relief. The court reasoned that
the plaintiff-developer should have foreseen the land-use conflict with
the feedlot. The defendant, on the other hand, having previously lo-
93. See Spencer Creek Pollution Control Ass'n v. Organic Fertilizer Co., 505 P.2d
919 (Or. 1973) (finding that the record did not support an application of the "coming to
the nuisance" doctrine where there was a lack of clear evidence as to whether there was
a nuisance when plaintiffs purchased their land).
94. 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972).
95. See Collins, supra note 7, at 1009.
96. It has long been the law that the "coming to nuisance" defense is unavailable in
public nuisance situations.
97. See supra note 55 and accompanying text discussing the balancing process when
determining a nuisance remedy.
98. See Collins, supra note 7, at 1011-12.
99. See supra notes 25 & 26 and accompanying text for a discussion of the necessary
requirements for a public nuisance.
100. Spur, 494 F.2d at 706-08.
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cated in that area, had no reason to foresee such a future problem.01
The Spur remedy drew on the long recognized equitable principle that
injunctive relief may be granted subject to reasonable conditions. 10 2
It may be argued that the Spur court's remedy drew on indemnifica-
tion principles. Under the theory of indemnification, the liability of
one tortfeasor is shifted to another who is regarded as actually, or pri-
marily, at fault."13 In Spur, indemnification became an issue in deter-
mining whether individual Sun City residents had sustained damages
due to the feedlot operation and, if so, whether the developer should
indemnify the feedlot operator for any court-ordered damages paid to
the residents.' °4
Spur Industries is often mentioned as the only case granting indem-
nification rights to a party forced to discontinue an activity constituting
a nuisance.10 5 Although this proposition is true, the Spur remedy
builds on ample precedent. Spur's specific method of adjusting the eq-
uities may be a new approach,l °6 but the principles underlying the
101. See Collins, supra note 7, at 1012 (recognizing that the owner of the nuisance
property could have foreseen the land use problem (citing Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del
E. Webb Development Co., 494 P.2d 700, 706-07 (Ariz. 1972))).
102. See Cox, supra note 3, at 63 (outlining the Spur court's indemnification analy-
sis). See also Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. Rv. 1089, 1089-93, 1115-
24 (1972) (noting the necessity of the reimbursement remedy and the difficulties its
application would pose for the courts). See generally CURTiS J. BERGER, LAND OWN-
ERSHIP & USE 702 (3d ed. 1983) (discussing the Spur decision).
103. Id. at 60. See also William H. Skelton, Comment, Contribution and Indemnity
Among Joint Tortfeasors, 33 TENN. L. Rlv. 184, 185 (1966) (discissing the rationales
and development of contribution and indemnification theories). See generally Harold
A. Meriam & John V. Thornton, Indemnity Between Tortfeasor" An Evolving Doctrine
in the New York Court of Appeals, 25 N.Y.U. L. REv. 845 (1950) (discussing the evolu-
tion of New York indemnity law).
104. Spur Feeding Co. v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 505 P.2d 1377, 1378
(Ariz. 1973) (en banc) (holding that because the prior suit concerned only the developer
and the feedlot operator, judgment was not res judicata as to a third-party complaint
against the developer by the feedlot operator to indemnity for damages suffered by
others).
105. Jack W. Shaw, Jr., Annotation, Nuisance: Right of One Compelled to Discon-
tinue Business or Activity Constituting Nuisance to Indemnity from Successful Plaintiff,
53 A.L.R. 3D 873, 874 (1973) (discussing the Spur case).
106. See generally WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., CASES & MATERIALS ON TORTS
847 (8th ed. 1988) (compiling a list of nuisance law studies); Jeff L. Lewin, Compensated
Injunctions and the Evolution of Nuisance Law, 71 IOWA L. REv. 775, 775 (1986) (not-
ing that "[t]he past twenty-five years have witnessed an entirely new approach to nui-
sance law in which land use conflicts are analyzed in economic terms, with an emphasis
on the goal of efficiency in resource allocation").
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court's nuisance analysis have deep historical roots.
REACTION AND ALTERNATIVES TO SPUR
Some have suggested that at least three theories may support the
remedy awarded in the Spur Industries case: (1) the theory of unjust
enrichment, holding that one who has unjustly enriched another
should make restitution to the injured party; (2) the active-passive neg-
ligence distinction, under which a party whose liability is attributable
to merely passive conduct is entitled to reimbursement from an active
wrongdoer who contributed to the same harm; and (3) the doctrine of
indemnity, which provides that a party who discharges a duty that is
primarily owed by another is entitled to reimbursement from the re-
sponsible party." 7 The Spur court has been criticized for not having
clearly endorsed any of these doctrines, 0 8s though the opinion appar-
ently relies on indemnification more than any other theory. 109
Regardless of the court's reasoning, Spur has been praised as estab-
lishing a desirable precedent requiring the developer to compensate the
feedlot in return for its moving or shutting down. This encourages de-
velopers to make reasonable attempts to anticipate future problems
when they select locations. If the developer did not have to bear the
cost of moving the nuisance, the developer would have no incentive to
avoid inappropriate areas. Therefore, the Spur decision may promote
efficient decision-making.11o The Spur solution satisfies both the plain-
tiff and the defendant; the plaintiff realizes his goal of terminating the
nuisance, while the defendant avoids liability and moving expenses. 1 '
The type of conditional injunctiqn awarded in Spur has ample prece-
dent.'1 2 However, a court of equity usually will frame conditional re-
107. Collins, supra note 7, at 1013-17 (1973) (discussing the three theories that
could be employed to support the Spur remedy).
108. See id. at 1013 (noting the Arizona court "failed to articulate an adequate basis
for the novel remedy it created in Spur").
109. Id. at 1016. The Spur court specifically asked: "Must Del Webb indemnify
Spur?" Spur, 494 P.2d at 706.
110. See Wittman, supra note 67, at 566 (arguing that the "courts are encouraging
individuals to make efficient decisions by anticipating the future and considering the
whole stream of costs and benefits").
111. See Ellickson, supra note 53, at 744-45 (explaining the advantages of a com-
pensated injunction approach).
112. John M. Carnahan, III, Note, Remedies-Enjoining a Nuisance-Damages to
the Defendant as a Condition of Granting the Injunction, 38 Mo. L. REv. 135, 136
(1973). This note observes that injunctive relief will usually be denied provided that
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lief in a manner opposite to that used in Spur. Courts will, as in
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.,"'3 deny injunctive relief against a nui-
sance but will condition this denial on the defendant paying permanent
damages to the plaintiff.114 This approach is subject to criticism as
granting a kind of power of private eminent domain. 1 '
The Spur method may similarly be regarded as allowing a private
party to condemn a negative easement over defendant's land. 116 If the
two methods are considered equal, it is significant that Spur at least
eliminates or reduces the nuisance.1 17 The Spur case has been hailed as
"a sound development in the law of public nuisance,"118 particularly
the "coming to the nuisance" doctrine, 1 9 because the Arizona court's
remedy balances the equities and protects the rights of both the public
and the defendant.120
defendants pay damages. Id. In Spur, by contrast, the court granted injunctive relief
provided that the plaintiff pay damages. Id. The author notes that there is only one
noted comparable case, New Castle City v. Raney, 6 Pa. C. 87 (1889), rev'd on other
grounds sub nor. Appeal of McClain, 18 A. 1066 (Pa. 1890), where a city which had
brought an action to abate a mill dam was required to remove the dam at its own
expense. See Cox, supra note 3, at 64 n.59 (1973) (noting the possibility that New Castle
City may be analogous to Spur).
113. 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970). See generally Symposium on Nuisance Law:
Twenty Years After Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 54 ALB. L. REV. 171 (1990) (an in-
depth analysis of Boomer and nuisance law).
114. See Bartman v. Shobe, 353 S.W.2d 550, 556-57 (Ky. Ct. App. 1962) (denying
an injunction where a disposal plant causes sewage to drain onto plaintiff's land, but
conditioning the denial on the defendant paying damages).
115. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 871, 876 (N.Y. 1970) (Jasen,
J., dissenting) (fearing takings as a result of the Spur majority holding). But see Carna-
han, supra note 112, at 138 (discussing possible arguments that the taking - if one oc-
curred in such cases as Boomer - was a public taking or a private condemnation
properly approved by the courts in their exercise of their equity powers). See generally
Hiley, Involuntary Sale Damages in Permanent Nuisance Cases: A Bigger Bang from
Boomer, 14 Environmental Affairs 61, 73-76 (1986).
116. See Carnahan, supra note 112, at 139 (defining a negative easement as "one
which precludes the owner of land subject to such easement from doing an act which if
no easement existed, he would be entitled to do" (quoting Wilson v. Owen, 262 S.W.2d
19, 24 & n.31 (Mo. 1953))).
117. See Haven Tobias, Note, Land Use and Environmental Policy: Litigation of
Nuisances as a Land Use Controb The Spur Industries Case, 26 OKLA. L. Rn'V. 583,
588 (1973) (noting that the Spur doctrine may reduce the peril to landowners locating
near noxious industries).
118. Recker, supra note 89, at 565.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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This praise may indicate that other courts may apply Spur's method
of relief in the future. Courts will be restricted, however, in applying
the method to nuisance cases in which two factors are present. First,
the public is substantially disturbed by the nuisance; and second, there
is some colorable argument that the plaintiff has "come to the nui-
sance." '121 Within the narrow confines imposed by these limitations,
the Spur court's assessment of costs is supported by sound policy
grounds: the substantial fault of the plaintiff-developer and the duty-
separate from and arguably greater than that of the defendant feed-
lot-owed by the developer to the Sun City residents.122
The proper question is what advantages are gained through the
Boomer court's method of conditioning the denial of an injunction on
payment of damages to the defendants,1 23 and when would that
method be preferable to the Spur remedy? Both opinions have been
cited as examples of courts exercising their "equitable discretion and
ingenuity in ordering remedies." 24 The Boomer court noted the social
and economic importance of allowing defendant's operation to con-
tinue in light of the large investment involved, the number of people
employed by the plant, and the dire consequences that termination
would have on the financial well-being of the area.125
It has been observed, however, that to allow the continuation of a
polluting factory to prevent unemployment is different from the public
benefit present in cases dealing with a public utility or other essential
business. 126 In these cases, courts developed the doctrine that no in-
junction will be issued as a matter of right against a nuisance upon
which the public welfare depends. 127
121. See Collins, supra note 7, at 1018-19 (1973) (hailing the Spur doctrine as a
"versatile tool for the equitable resolution of varied nuisance situations"); Cox, supra
note 3, at 73-74 (discussing the extent of the applicability of indemnification under
Spur).
122. Id. at 64-69 (examining the classifications of the relative fault of the parties).
123. See supra notes 113 & 114 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Boomer case.
124. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 314 n.7 (1982).
125. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 872-73 (N.Y. 1970).
126. Bruce V. Weitzen, Note, Nuisance-Permanent Damages Awarded in Lieu of
an Injunction Where Resultant Damage from Nuisance Was Substantial, 20 BuFF. L.
Rav. 312, 316 (1970) (explaining that a court cannot disregard possible public injury
from pollution).
127. See id. at 312-13 (noting the reluctance of the courts to grant injunctive relief
where the public substantially relies upon the business that creates the nuisance).
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If the injunction is denied on the basis of the private benefit of pro-
tecting defendant's investment, then the resulting harm to other private
interests from continuation of the business should also be weighed.128
Further, allowing defendants to forever acquire the right to injure the
plaintiffs' property presents not only a possible unconstitutional taking
of property for private use,1 29 but also a forced sale inconsistent with
the entire private ownership concept. 130 Thus, while Boomer attempts
a compromise through balancing the conveniences of the parties, 13 1 the
result is potentially more harmful to the public and likely more suscep-
tible to successful legal challenge than the Spur decision.
The assessment of damages also seems easier under Spur. In Spur,
the measure is simply the reasonable cost of moving or terminating the
business. Under Boomer, damages are based on harm not only to the
present use of the plaintiff's property but also for injury to reasonably
foreseeable future uses. 132 Moreover, Boomer damages must take into
account such difficult to assess factors as the value to plaintiff of free-
dom from dust and other annoyances created by a nearby cement
128. Id. at 316.
129. See Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 311, 315 (1859) (noting that property may not
be taken and sold for individual convenience where the public benefit is too weak).
130. See Hiley, supra note 118, at 74.
131. See C. HAZAR & M. WOLF, LAND USE PLANNING 124 (4th ed. 1989) (noting
support for the Boomer approach in opinions by two leading jurists: City of Harrison-
ville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334 (1933) (Brandeis, J.) and Smith v.
Staso Milling Co., 18 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1927) (Learned Hand, Jr.)). See generally
Michael S. Maram, Comment, Nuisance Abatement: Use of the Comparative Injury
Doctrine, 1971 URB. L. ANN. 206 (discussing the application of the doctrine of compar-
ative injury in the nuisance context); Note, Private Nuisance-Abatement and Injunc-
tion-Disparity of Economic Consequences, 22 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 356 (1971)
(discussing the Boomer decision); Gerald R. Stowers, Note, Remedies-Private Nui-
sance-Comparative Injury Doctrine in West Virginia, 77 W. VA. L. REv. 780 (1975)
(discussing factors important in the balancing of conflicting interests under the doctrine
of comparative injury). See also Note, Enjoining Private Nuisances Consideration of
the Public Interest, 43 U. COLO. L. REv. 225, 228 (1971) (criticizing the Boomer court's
application of the comparative injury doctrine and emphasizing that public interests
must also be evaluated under the test).
132. See Larry C. Wood, Note, Nuisance-A Feed Lot Which Will Interfere with a
Future Use of Another's Land Will Justify the Recovery of Permanent Damages, 4 TEx.
TECH L. REv. 444, 447 (1973) (noting that Meat Producers Inc. v. McFarland, 476
S.W.2d 406 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972) involved an award of permanent damages for a feedlot
nuisance in which testimony indicated that the most desirable use of plaintiff's land in
the reasonably foreseeable future would be, but for the feedlot's presence, used as resi-
dential homesites).
1992]
Washington University Open Scholarship
96 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 41:75
plant.133
On balance, the Spur approach would therefore seem to raise fewer
objections and offer more advantages than the Boomer method. Both
methods may still remain in the arsenal of available remedies that
courts of equity can use in providing nuisance relief. Assuming the
constitutional objections are satisfied, the desirability of one method
over the other may vary according to the circumstances of each case.
The most important consideration is the need and desirability in spe-
cific situations of either terminating the bothersome use or allowing it
to continue.
THE FUTURE OF THE SPUR CASE
As noted, the Spur holding is likely to be limited to situations involv-
ing a substantial disturbance to the public and the plaintiff "coming to
the nuisance." 134 The Spur justices indicated a more severe restriction,
stating that the relief granted was limited to the facts actually
presented.135 The court's extreme restriction of limiting the unique
remedy to nearly identical fact patterns seems unnecessarily cautious.
The unusual nature of the remedy awarded probably inspired the ex-
press limitation. 136 A more lasting limitation on the remedy, however,
may be the Spur court's general indication that the remedy will be em-
ployed only where the plaintiff foresaw, or at least should have reason-
ably foreseen, the impending injury to the defendant. Without the
element of foreseeability, it is doubtful that the plaintiff could be
charged with negligence and have to pay for the relief obtained. 137
Some commentators have justified Spur's remedy on the bases of un-
just enrichment and indemnification even in situations where the plain-
tiff could not have foreseen the defendant's harm. 138 These theories do
not depend on any fault of the plaintiff.139 Fault on the defendant's
133. Tobias, supra note 117, at 587 (asking "what value can be assessed in money
on a life ... free from a barrage of dust and other annoying by-products of cement
production?").
134. See supra note 121 and accompanying text for a discussion of the limited appli-
cation of Spur's remedy.
135. Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 708 (Ariz. 1972).
136. See Collins, supra note 7, at 1017 (noting that "[t]his restriction, though possi-
bly unnecessary, is understandable since the Spur remedy had never been employed
before").
137. Id. at 1018.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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part, however, particularly where it involves the defendant "coming"
to the plaintiff with the nuisance, is likely to prevent the defendant
from receiving the award of costs that the Spur feedlot received. 1"
These actions will instead result in an unconditional injunction against
defendant's bothersome activity.
Much litigation concerning feedlots and similarly annoying land-
uses can be avoided through wise legislation. The legislation can range
from the specific restrictions on odor intensity now adopted in several
states 141 to more general types of zoning laws. 4 2 These laws, and the
use of common sense in selecting a site for a potentially bothersome
use, can prevent nuisances from developing most of the time. 143 One
author has suggested that courts could benefit from additional legisla-
tive guidance creating a particular "substantive law of feedlot odor
control which reflects our values and priorities.""
No legislation can prevent all nuisances, whether arising from cattle
feedlots or other activities. When faced with a true nuisance situation,
some commentators urge the courts to allow the defendant, in all but
situations of the most outrageous conduct, to "buy his way out of an
injunction" by paying plaintiff damages.1 4 ' This was the approach of
the Boomer court, 46 and it certainly remains a viable option in nui-
sance cases. The Boomer option should be used sparingly, however,
and only where the defendant has shown a willingness to make reason-
140. See Cox, supra note 3, at 74 (arguing that the "danger in expanding indemnifi-
cation beyond reasonable limits, then, is the extension of the injunctive remedy").
141. See supra note 90 and accompanying text for an explanation of these statutes.
142. See Recker, supra note 89, at 569-70 (explaining that zoning ordinances may
become an important factor in regulating feedlot enterprises).
143. Id. (noting that site selection is the most important method to avoid nuisance
suits).
144. Burke, supra note 32, at 591 (1977).
145. See Rabin, supra note 80, at 1335 (arguing that where a defendant's conduct is
so egregious that he deserves punitive treatment, an injunction is warranted). See gener-
ally Henry L. McClintock, Discretion to Deny Injunction Against Trespass and Nui-
sance, 12 MINN. L. Rnv. 565, 570 (1928) (discussing factors the court should evaluate,
including the conduct of the parties, in balancing equities to determine whether to issue
an injunction for trespass or nuisance); William F. Walsh, Equitable ReliefAgainst Nui-
sance, 7 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 352, 367-74 (discussing what conduct warrants injunctive re-
lief) (1929); Charles R. Schwiddle, Comment, Remedial Flexibility in Injunctions
Against Nuisances-A Product of the Search for Middle Ground, 7 WILLAMETrE L. J.
279, 279-82 (1971) (discussing factors that courts consider in arriving at a variety of
remedies for nuisance, including injunctions).
146. See supra notes 113 & 114 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Boomer holding.
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able efforts to keep the offensiveness of his activity to a minimum.147
"The threat of an injunction would remain and should be imposed on
defendants who have failed to act responsibly." 14 Without this con-
tinued threat, the defendant who has "purchased" his right to maintain
a nuisance has little incentive to exercise future restraint in the opera-
tion of that nuisance. Awards of damages and assessment of fines by
public authorities149 may be adequate if the harm from the nuisance is
not too great and is not likely to become greater. Where substantial
public harm appears likely to remain as long as the nuisance continues,
the Spur option of applying a "liability rule" and allowing the "buying
out" of the nuisance, rather than the "buying off" of those bothered by
it, appears more environmentally sound.
CONCLUSION
Despite the proliferation of land-use legislation, the nuisance action
remains an important tool for the protection of individual property
owners disturbed in the use of their land.15° Nuisance law draws on,
but is not bound by, zoning and other land-use law in determining
what is a reasonable or unreasonable use of property.'51 In this re-
147. See Craig Rotherham, The Allocation of Remedies in Private Nuisance: An
Evaluation of the Judicial Approach to Awarding Damages in Lieu of an Injunction, 4
CANTERBURY L. REv. 185, 200 (1989) (arguing that threatening polluters with an in-
junction may make them more responsible for controlling emissions).
148. Id. See generally A. I. Ogus & G. M. Richardson, Economics and the Environ-
ment: A Study of Private Nuisance, 36 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 284 (1977) (discussing the
remedies available in private nuisance as a means of environmental protection).
149. See Ellickson, supra note 53, at 761-62 (suggesting fines against pervasive nui-
sances as an appropriate supplement to the nuisance remedies available to private per-
sons able to show substantial injury from a nuisance).
150. See Wilson, supra note 11, at 119-20 (concluding that nuisance plays an impor-
tant role in the system of land-use controls).
151. See, eg., Commerce Oil Ref. Corp. v. Miner, 170 F. Supp. 396, 409 (D.R.I.
1959) (holding that town attitudes, as reflected in local zoning laws, could be considered
in determining whether oil refining could constitute a nuisance); Lauderdale County Bd.
of Educ. v. Alexander, 110 So. 2d 911, 915-16 (Ala. 1959) (holding that the definition of
a nuisance is dependent upon location because the act complained of may be considered
a nuisance in one area and not in another); Rockenbach v. Apostle, 47 N.W.2d 636, 639
(Mich. 1951) (holding that a zoning ordinance is not controlling but may be admissible
as evidence in establishing what constitutes a nuisance); White v. Old York Rd. Coun-
try Club, 185 A. 316, 318-19 (Pa. 1936) (same). Cf. Sohns v. Jensen, 105 N.W.2d 818,
824 (Wis. 1960) (holding that lawful business may be conducted in such a way as to be a
nuisance either because of its location, or because of the effect of the operation). See
generally Angelo V. Chini, Note, Torts-Notwithstanding Compliance With Zoning
Regulations, Nuisance in Fact Held Enjoined, 11 SYRACUSE L. REv. 323, 325 (1960)
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spect, as in fashioning appropriate relief between conflicting uses, nui-
sance law has always exhibited great flexibility. In general, the scope
of nuisance law has widened and its application has become more lib-
eral."5 2 As part of the flexibility and liberalization of that law, it is
appropriate that the Spur remedy of "conditional injunction" receive
consideration in any case in which protection is needed both for inno-
cent members of the public and an innocent but bothersome
landowner.
(noting that while a court will not enjoin a business operation which is in compliance
with zoning law, the court will enjoin the operation of the business if it becomes an
unreasonable nuisance); Robert B. Fiske, Jr., Comment, Real Property-The Effect of
Zoning Ordinances on the Law of Nuisance, 54 MICH. L. REv. 266, 276 (1955) (stating
that zoning ordinances have the effect of upholding conduct which would otherwise
constitute a nuisance unless the nuisance is unreasonable and causes substantial injury);
John Franklin, Note, Zoning Ordinances and Common-Law Nuisance, 16 SYRACUSE L.
Rav. 860 (1965) (discussing the effect of zoning ordinances on the plaintiff's ability to
acquire an injunction against conduct which constitutes a nuisance and the admission of
zoning ordinances as evidence of what constitutes a nuisance); Maxine Kurtz, The Ef-
fect of Land Use Legislation on the Common Law of Nuisance in Urban Areas, 36 DicrA
414, 414 (1959) (discussing the effect of land-use regulation on the legal and equitable
remedies available for nuisance actions); Note, Nuisance-Zoning Law-Injunction to
Restrain Proposed Operation, 9 FORDHAM L. Rlv. 437, 437-38 (1940) (suggesting that
undertaking a business in compliance with local ordinances cannot be enjoined as a
nuisance if properly operated).
152. See Comment, Zoning and the Law of Nuisance, 29 FORDHAM L. REv. 749,
756 (1961) (explaining the liberalization of nuisance law).
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